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1. Introduction 
Cultural diversity is both persistent and precarious. People in different regions of the world 
are increasingly exposed to global influences from mass media, internet communication, in-
terregional migration and mass tourism. English is rapidly becoming Earth’s Lingua Franca, 
and Western music, films, and fashions can be found even in remote villages around the 
globe. While some authors point to the pervasiveness of cultural differences, others expect 
globalization to lead to the emergence of a universal monoculture (cf. Greig, 2002). This ex-
pectation is grounded not only in empirical observation of recent trends (Friedman, 2005) but 
also in formal theoretical models of social influence that predict an inexorable tendency to-
ward cultural convergence (French 1956; Abelson 1964). Abelson proved that convergence to 
global consensus was inevitable in what he called a “compact” network – in which there are 
no subgroups that are entirely cut off from outside influences. Friedkin and Johnson (1999) 
showed later that even in compact networks some diversity may remain if actors’ initial opin-
ions reflect persistent individual interests that are entirely neutralized by outside influences.   
 Recently, formal theories of social influences have pointed to homophily as a new ex-
planation of cultural diversity. Building on previous work by Carley (1991) and by Nowak et 
al (1990), Axelrod (1997; see also Mark 1998) proposed an elegant extension of social influ-
ence models that allows the network to change in response to changes in the distribution of 
cultural attributes. Like earlier formal models, Axelrod assumed one of the fundamental prin-
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ciples of human interaction – social influence, or the tendency to become more similar to in-
fluential others (Festinger et al, 1950). However, unlike earlier social influence models that 
assumed fixed social networks, Axelrod incorporated the equally fundamental principle of 
“likes attract”, or homophily (McPherson et al, 2001). Combined with social influence, ho-
mophily generates a self-reinforcing dynamic in which growing similarity strengthens attrac-
tion, attraction increases influence, and influence leads to greater similarity.  
 This circular dynamic might appear to merely strengthen the tendency towards global 
convergence demonstrated by models with a fixed network structure (e.g. Abelson, 1964). 
However, Axelrod’s computational studies showed how local convergence can preserve 
global diversity. The key assumption is cultural speciation. Axelrod assumed social interac-
tion becomes impossible between actors who have nothing in common, analogous to the in-
ability of sexual organisms with a common ancestor to mate once they differentiate beyond a 
critical threshold. Once influence between regions becomes impossible, their cultures evolve 
along divergent paths.  
A range of follow up studies supported Axelrod’s basic conclusions (e.g. Mark 1998, 
2003; Parisi et al 2003), albeit with some modifications (e.g. Shibanai et al 2001; Greig, 
2002). However, Klemm et al (2003a,b) challenged the robustness of stable diversity in Ax-
elrod’s model. They showed that a population that exhibits stable diversity under Axelrod’s 
assumptions “drifts” toward monoculture in the presence of even very small amounts of ran-
dom “cultural mutation.” Mutation increases local heterogeneity by allowing agents to spon-
taneously deviate from their neighbors by altering one of their cultural traits. Paradoxically, 
this heterogeneity promotes not diversity but global convergence. Local convergence can trap 
a population in an equilibrium in which influence is no longer possible because neighbors are 
either identical or totally different. Mutation disturbs this equilibrium, allowing influence to 
proceed to a new equilibrium with less diversity than the last, and so on, until no differences 
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remain. Given that in most cultural influence processes there are at least a few deviants who 
spontaneously introduce cultural mutations to their neighbors we are thus back to our original 
question: How is stable diversity possible?  
 We propose that Axelrod is right about homophily, but his model was too conservative 
in its implementation. This becomes plausible when we notice two hidden assumptions in Ax-
elrod’s model that attenuate the effects of homophily on the formation of influential ties. First, 
Axelrod has an implicit threshold of similarity below which agents cannot influence one an-
other. He made the highly conservative assumption that this threshold was at the theoretical 
lower limit of zero influence. Klemm et al. also assumed a zero threshold of similarity. At this 
level, there will be some positive probability of influence except in the special case that two 
agents have absolutely nothing in common. As the number of cultural features increases, the 
probability that two randomly chosen agents will have nothing in common approaches zero, 
in which case, every agent has some attraction to every other agent. Raising the influence 
threshold strengthens homophily by limiting attraction to a subset of neighbors whose similar-
ity exceeds a critical value. 
 Second, Axelrod assumed that influence was dyadic. Dyadic influence attenuates the 
effects of homophily by allowing agents to imitate a deviant in isolation from the countervail-
ing influence from all the other conforming neighbors. That is, Axelrod assumes that agents 
focus on only one neighbor at a time, ignoring the traits of all their other neighbors. This al-
lows agents to imitate a deviant neighbor while ignoring the influence of conformist 
neighbors. Instead, we allowed a randomly chosen agent to be simultaneously influenced by 
multiple neighbors, rather than by just one randomly chosen neighbor at a time (cf. Parisi 
2003 for a similar approach). By allowing multiplex influence, it is no longer possible for a 
deviant to lure its neighbors by influencing them one at a time. This strengthens the effects of 
homophily by insuring that agents can never be influenced in a direction that leaves them with 
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less in common with their neighbors overall. If homophily is the mechanism by which global 
convergence generates local diversity, then strengthening the tendency toward convergence 
might have the counterintuitive effect of allowing stable diversity to emerge. 
 In the section that follows, we describe our extensions of the Axelrod model designed 
to strengthen homophily. Section 3 presents results of computational experiments. In section 
4, we discuss the our analysis and identify promising directions for future research. 
 
2. An Extended Model of Cultural Influence 
We began by replicating Axelrod’s (1997) dynamic network model of homophily and influ-
ence, with no mutation, a zero threshold of similarity, and dyadic influence (from only one 
neighbor at a time). We then extended this model by introducing the assumption of mutation 
that causes diversity to collapse, and two additional assumptions – higher thresholds and mul-
tiplex influence – that strengthen homophily. This allows us to test the hypothesis that the fra-
gility of cultural diversity in the original Axelrod specification reflects too little homophily, 
not too much. If this hypothesis is confirmed, it means that Axelrod did not go far enough. 
Not only does global convergence produce local diversity, but the stronger the convergent 
tendency, the more stable the emergent diversity. 
 In the original Axelrod model, the population consists of N agents distributed over a 
regular bounded (non-toroidal) lattice, where each cell is occupied by a single agent who can 
interact only with the four neighbors to the N, S, E, and W (a von Neumann neighborhood). 
At any point in time, the cultural profile for an agent is a vector of F features1. On any feature 
                                                 
1  We follow Axelrod in referring to cultural dimensions – like religion, musical preference, ethnicity, or occupa-
tion – as “features,” and locations on these dimensions – like Catholic, Baptist, or Muslim – as “traits.” 
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f, an agent has a trait q represented by an integer value in the range of q = {0...Q – 1}, where 
Q is the number of possible traits on that feature. Formally, the cultural profile C of agent i is  
⊂−∈= }1,...,1,0{),,...,,( 21 QqqqqC ixiFiii N0.  (1) 
 Following Axelrod, agents in our baseline model start out with a random cultural pro-
file in which each feature is assigned a trait q from a uniform distribution. In every discreet 
time step t, an agent i is randomly chosen from the population, and i’s cultural profile is up-
dated through interaction with a randomly chosen neighbor j. The probability pij that j will 
interact with i is given by their cultural overlap, defined as the proportion of all F features 
with identical traits. Two agents i and j have identical traits on feature f if qif = qjf. If i and j do 
not interact, another agent is randomly chosen for possible interaction with a randomly chosen 
neighbor. If i and j do interact, j influences i by causing i to adopt j’s trait on a feature ran-
domly chosen from the set of features on which qif ≠ qjf.  
Up to this point, our specification of the influence process is identical to the influence 
process assumed by Axelrod (1997) and also by Klemm et al (2003a,b). 
We introduced three changes to this “baseline” model. The first change – cultural mu-
tation – is expected to destabilize diversity, leading to the inevitability of monoculture. The 
second two changes – higher thresholds of similarity and simultaneous influence from multi-
ple neighbors – are hypothesized as antidotes that allow stable diversity to emerge even under 
conditions that would otherwise guarantee monoculture. 
1. Cultural mutation. Following Klemm et al. (2003a,b), we implemented cultural mu-
tation as a small probability r that a randomly chosen trait will be perturbed to a new value 
randomly chosen over the interval {0…Q – 1}. 
 2. Thresholds of similarity. Our other two extensions of Axelrod’s model are intended 
to strengthen the effects of homophily by precluding influence from neighbors who are insuf-
ficiently similar. Raising the threshold of similarity relaxes the linear relationship that Ax-
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elrod and Klemm et al. assume between influence and overlap. The linear form carries the 
implicit assumption that the threshold of similarity (below which influence is precluded) is at 
the theoretical lower limit, which means that any shared traits, no matter how few, are suffi-
cient for there to be a positive probability of influence. We simply raised this lower limit by 
introducing a threshold τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) above which the probability of influence remains linear 
with cultural overlap (identical to Axelrod) but below which the probability is zero: 
⎩⎨
⎧ ≤=
otherwise 
 if   0
ij
ij
ij o
o
p
τ
   (2) 
where ijo  represents the extent of cultural overlap given by the proportion of features with 
identical traits (cf. Deffuant et al, 2005, for a similar approach called “bounded confidence”). 
 3. Multiplex influence. In the baseline model, an agent is randomly chosen from the 
population who then randomly picks a single neighbor to be imitated with a probability corre-
sponding to the proportion of similar features. In order to allow multiplex influence, we as-
sume that all neighbors can potentially be included in the set of influential neighbors, each 
with a probability corresponding to the proportion of similar features. Once the set of influen-
tial neighbors has been formed, the focal agent adopts on a randomly selected feature the trait 
that is supported by the largest number of influential neighbors. In case a tie occurs, a random 
choice is made between all maximally popular traits. This preserves the original dyadic influ-
ence model as a condition nested within a more general form, such that multiplex influence 
reduces to the original model when an agent has only one influential neighbor.  With more 
than one influential neighbor, it is no longer possible for a deviant to induce a neighbor to 
adopt a trait that is an outlier within the distribution over all influential neighbors. 
 More precisely, we assume that, at a given timepoint t, i can be simultaneously influ-
enced by a subset of i’s neighbors, where each neighbor j is selected into the subset of influ-
ential neighbors Ii with a probability corresponding to the cultural overlap between i and j, as 
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specified in equation (4). Following Axelrod, a random number rij is drawn from a uniform 
distribution, where 0 ≤ ri ≤1, and this value is then compared with the overlap oij between i 
and j. If oij exceeds rij, then j is added to I: 
{ }ijiji roiJjI ≥∈= )( ,   (3) 
where J(i) denotes the set of all neighbors j of i.  
 Agent i then adopts the modal trait on f within Ii. That is, i observes the trait qfk on f of 
every member k of the influence set. The modal trait m, is obtained as the number of influen-
tial neighbors of i,  fmv , who have trait m on feature f, or 
[ ] }{:1..0 mqIkvQm fkifm =∈=−∈∀   (4) 
If more than one trait satisfies this criterion, i chooses randomly from among those traits.  
 Importantly, our extended model reduces to Axelrod’s original specification if the rate 
of cultural mutation is zero, the threshold of similarity is zero, and there is only one influential 
neighbor, that is, τ = r= 0, and k=1. If r>0, i has a positive probability of spontaneously 
changing one of its cultural traits. If τ>0, cultural overlap has no effect on interaction until the 
amount of overlap exceeds the critical value. Finally, if influence is multiplex, an agent adopts 
the modal trait among all influential neighbors. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Baseline model 
As a baseline, we replicated Axelrod’s (1997) model, using the standard scenario that Axelrod 
employed throughout most of his simulations: a 10x10 grid (N=100), five features (F=5), 15 
traits per feature (Q=15), no mutation (r = 0), and a zero threshold of similarity (τ = 0). Using 
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Axelrod’s measure of diversity as the number of cultural regions in equilibrium,2 we obtained 
results identical to those reported by Axelrod. From a random start, cultural diversity rapidly 
declines but the rate of decline slows exponentially, culminating in an equilibrium at which 
influence is no longer possible because the overlap between all pairs of neighbors is either 0 
or 1. Based on 10 realizations, each from a random start, Axelrod reported for this condition 
an average of 20 stable cultural regions in equilibrium. We obtained an average of 19.55 
based on 100 realizations (and we suspect that Axelrod simply rounded this number up to 20). 
As an additional validity test, we replicated all other results reported in Axelrod (1997) for the 
effects of network size N, neighborhood size k, and the number of features F and traits Q.  
3.2 Diversity Collapses with Cultural Mutation  
We next replicated Klemm et al. (2003a) by introducing the possibility for cultural mutation 
(r >0). All other parameters were identical to the baseline model described above. For reliabil-
ity, we ran 20 realizations of the experiment, allowing each run to continue until the level of 
diversity became stable or the number of iterations exceeded 106. Our results were again iden-
tical to what previous work found: Low rates of mutation (r ≤≈ 10 – 3) were sufficient to de-
stabilize diversity so that the system gradually moves from a random start towards a metasta-
ble state close to cultural homogeneity.  
Figure 1 reports the typical dynamics for a mutation level of r = 10 – 3. Over 20 reali-
zations, we averaged 1.55 cultural regions in the end-state, compared to 20 regions with r = 0. 
Panel 3 of Figure 1 also illustrates how cultural diversity no longer declines monotonically in 
the presence of mutation. This shows that mutations have two paradoxical effects. On the one 
hand, mutations create bridges for social influence between otherwise isolated cultural re-
                                                 
2 Klemm et al (2003a,b) use the relative size of the largest cultural region in equilibrium. 
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gions. These bridges act as an annealing mechanism that allows the system to escape a local 
equilibrium and find a new equilibrium with less diversity. On the other hand, mutation can 
also spark the spontaneous emergence of new cultural regions when new traits appear and 
spread over the network. At the low level of mutation used for Figure 1, the first effect pre-
vails. Mutations prevent the population from “freezing” in multicultural states with multiple 
disconnected cultural regions, leading inevitably to a monoculture that is highly resistant to 
further disturbance. As Klemm et al showed, at this point mutations may cause spontaneous 
“fads” that lead from one monoculture into another, but the level of diversity remains consis-
tently at its minimum except for short transition periods.  
   
t=60K t=210K t=350K t=390K 
Figure 1a. Representative dynamics with mutation (N=100, k=4, F=5, Q=15, τ = 0, r=0.001, dyadic interac-
tion). Color of a cell represents trait on feature 1. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000 800000 900000 1000000
  
Figure 1b. Change of average number of cultural regions with mutation (N=100, k=4, F= 5, Q=15, τ = 0, 
r=0.001, dyadic interaction), based on 20 replications.  
 
Our results confirm the fragility of Axelrod’s results reported by Klemm et al. Very small 
amounts of cultural mutation are sufficient to cause stable diversity to collapse. In the next 
# iterations 
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sections, we report results that show how interaction thresholds and multiplex interaction can 
restore the robustness of Axelrod’s results.  
3.3 Higher thresholds of similarity  
We begin by considering the threshold effect. Axelrod and Klemm et al. assumed a threshold 
at the theoretical lower limit of zero, which means neighbors always have some positive prob-
ability to imitate one another, except in the unlikely case that they do not have a single shared 
trait. This appears to be an appropriately conservative assumption when testing for the col-
lapse of diversity. However, we need to know if the effects of mutation and metric features 
depend on the assumption that the threshold is zero.  
To test this, we replicated the studies of Klemm et al. except that we raised the thresh-
old of similarity from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.05. For reliability we report averages across 20 in-
dependent replications per condition. Outcomes were measured when equilibrium was ap-
proached. We stopped the simulation when there was no more change of diversity within the 
last 200.000 iterations, or the number of iterations exceeded 107. Figure 2 shows the number 
of metastable cultural regions broken down by the rate of mutation and the threshold level. 
0
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Figure 2. Effect of threshold τ  on number of cultural regions in equilibrium for five levels of mutation, 
with F=Fn = 5, Q = 15, dyadic interaction. Averages based on 20 replications per condition after maxi-
mally 107 iterations.  
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The results reported in Figure 2 clearly reveal the paradoxical effects of mutation. Figure 2 
shows that cultural diversity can be sustained, even with mutation, so long as  the threshold is 
at least 0.4. As τ increases further, the number of cultural regions in equilibrium approaches 
the theoretical maximum of 100, indicating a population in which almost all agents are cul-
tural isolates. Inspection of the convergence times until equilibrium shows why. From a ran-
dom start, thresholds above 0.4 are sufficient to effectively preclude interaction. It becomes 
extremely unlikely that two neighboring agents will have sufficient cultural overlap to obtain 
a positive probability of influence or a non-zero weight. 
Figure 2 also shows how this pattern changes as thresholds and mutation rates in-
crease. With a threshold of 0.2 or lower, the number of cultural regions without mutation is 
about 20, consistently with what Axelrod found without thresholds. But with mutation, diver-
sity can only be sustained when the interaction threshold exceeds the critical level of τ=0.4. 
When thresholds drop below 0.4 (corresponding to two or one common trait in a model with 
F=5) does diversity collapse into monoculture under mutation. However, as soon as the 
threshold reaches 0.6, the level of diversity approaches its theoretical maximum of 100 differ-
ent cultural regions for the mutation rates that we simulated in this experiment. Further analy-
ses showed that these effects did not change qualitatively even with at least 109 iterations.  
Sufficiently high thresholds resurrect diversity in the face of cultural mutation, but 
does the extended model generate the same substantive implications than Axelrod’s original 
model of cultural dissemination? We found at least one notable exception. Axelrod (1997) 
argued that a larger number of cultural features dramatically reduces cultural diversity. We 
found that the underlying mechanism depends critically on the assumption of zero thresholds. 
From a random start, any additional feature increases the chances that neighbors have identi-
cal traits larger than zero on at least one feature. With a threshold of zero, this implies that 
more features reduce the chances of cultural isolation and thus also the expected level of sta-
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ble cultural diversity. However, with higher thresholds a “critical mass” of identical features 
is needed before neighbors are sufficiently similar to have a chance to interact. This may turn 
Axelrod’s effect upside down: the more features, the larger this critical mass and thus the 
smaller may be the chances that identical traits occur on the required number of features. To 
test this intuition, we returned to Axelrod’s assumptions of zero mutation (r=0) and increased 
the number of features F between 1 and 50 for thresholds ranging from τ = 0 to τ = .2 in steps 
of 0.05. Figure 3 shows the results. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49
tau=0.1
tau=0.05
tau=0.15
tau=0.2
 
Figure 3. Effect of number of number of features (F) on number of cultural regions in equilibrium at four 
different levels of τ  (F=1..20 , Q=15, r = 0, dyadic influence). Averages based on 20 replications per condi-
tion after convergence.  
 
 Figure 3 shows that as τ  approaches zero, the effect of F is similar to what Axelrod 
reported for τ=0. However, as τ  increases, the effect of F reverses, leading to a dramatic 
secular increase in diversity. Note also the wave-shaped pattern. This is an artifact of the in-
tervals of F within which the critical number of features needed for influence remains con-
stant, such that increasing F has the same negative effect on diversity that was reported by 
Axelrod. The larger the number of features, the more likely it is that two agents will share the 
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required number of features for influence to become possible. However, as F increases fur-
ther, the threshold number jumps to its next higher level, and the probability of influence 
drops sharply, followed by an increase as F rises, until F again hits the point at which the 
number of required features increases again, and so on.  
To test our explanation of the effects of F and τ , we calculated the probability that 
two randomly chosen opinion vectors have sufficient overlap to have a positive probability of 
influence for a given threshold τ, based on the binominal distribution. The probability that 
two agents agree on any given feature is 1/Q, the probability that two independently drawn 
uniformly distributed random integers from the range [0..Q-1] obtain the same value. The 
probability that agreement occurs on exactly k out of F features, p(F,k), is obtained from the 
probability density function of the binomial distribution. Technically,  
)(
111),(
kFk
QQk
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kFp
−
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
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⎛=   (5) 
The probability of influence being possible, ),(* τFp , is obtained as the probability that 
agreement occurs on at least the threshold number of features, )(* τf , hence 
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  (6) 
The function is graphed in Figure 4. The analytical results confirm the computational results 
in Figure 3. As τ approaches zero, the probability of influence increases and diversity declines 
accordingly in F. However, for a given threshold τ, there is a secular decline in the probability 
of influence within those segments of the F-space for which the threshold number of features 
with identical traits remains constant. 
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In sum, these results suggest that the fragility of Axelrod’s results reflect hidden assumptions 
in his model that attenuated the effects of homophily. His linear probability function implies a 
zero threshold of similarity. With zero thresholds, a low rate of mutation or a single metric 
feature is sufficient for diversity to collapse. However, as the threshold of similarity increases, 
diversity turns out to be much more robust than the original Axelrod assumption implies. In 
particular, we find that higher thresholds can reverse the effect of a larger number of cultural 
features. With a sufficiently high threshold, diversity now increases with the number of fea-
tures. These results thus demonstrate the importance of homophily in explaining how local 
convergence can sustain global diversity. 
 
3.4 Effects of Resistance to Deviants 
In this section we report our test of the effects of multiplex influence on cultural diversity in 
Axelrod’s framework. We began by testing whether multiplex influence can avoid the col-
lapse of diversity that cultural mutation caused when the interaction threshold is zero. We rep-
licated the experiment of figure 1, but replaced Axelrod’s original assumption of dyadic influ-
ence with our implementation of multiplex influence. Figure 5 compares the average level of 
diversity across the two influence conditions, based on 20 replications per condition.  
F τ 
Figure 4. Probability of positive overlap between 
agents with random traits, as a function of F and 
τ, F=1..50, Q=15, r=0). 
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Figure 5. Effect of dyadic vs. multiplex interaction on change of average number of cultural regions with 
mutation (N=100, k=4, F= 5, Q=15, τ = 0, r=0.001), based on 20 replications. 
 
 Figure 5 confirms our expectation that multiplex influence greatly increases the ro-
bustness of cultural diversity against random mutations. With dyadic influence, average diver-
sity after 1.000.000 iterations has declined to a level of about 2.4, compared to 8.3 cultural 
regions with multiplex influence. But this result may be attributed to  two different explana-
tions. We have argued that multiplex interaction makes cultural regions more robust. This 
suggests that once a cultural region has established, it remains stable for a longer period of 
time as it would under dyadic influence. But there is another possibility: under multiplex in-
fluence, diversity decays to monoculture just as much as it does for dyadic influence, but the 
system is more sensitive to mutations, that is: occasional outbursts of “cultural innovation” 
spread wider and create temporarily more diversity than they do under dyadic influence. In 
the average across multiple replications, the result would also be higher diversity under multi-
plex interaction than under dyadic interaction, but in any single run the most likely state after 
some time is monoculture both under multiplex and under dyadic influence. To exclude this 
possibility, we inspected single realizations simulated under the same conditions that we used 
for figure 5 (N=100, k=4, F= 5, Q=15, τ = 0, r=0.001). Figure 6 shows typical example runs. 
# iterations
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Figure 6. Change of the number of cultural regions for single realizations under dyadic and multiplex in-
teraction, with mutation (N=100, k=4, F=Fn=5, Q=15, τ = 0, r=0.001). 
 
 Figure 6 indicates that simultaneous influence from all influential neighbors sustains 
the robustness of cultural regions. Not only is for r=0.001 the number of cultural regions after 
about 240.000 iterations in almost all iterations higher if influence is multiplex, but fluctua-
tions in cultural diversity that are triggered by mutations are also clearly much larger under 
dyadic influence. While this result shows how multiplex influence stabilizes cultural regions, 
we can still not be sure that the effect is persistent. Moreover, the stabilizing effect of multi-
plex influence may also vanish when there is a larger level of random mutation. To test for 
both possibilities, we extended the experiment to 10.000.000 iterations (ten times as long) and 
varied the level of random mutation from r=0.001 to r=0.005 in steps of 0.001. For reliability, 
we computed for each condition the average number of cultural regions across 50 independent 
replications. Figure 7 charts the average number of cultural regions after 107 iterations.  
# iterations
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Figure 7. Average number of cultural regions in endstate (after maximally 107 iterations) at six different 
levels of mutation (N=100, F= 5, Q=15, τ = 0, r=0..r=0.005), for multiplex and dyadic interaction, averages 
based on 50 replications per condition.  
 
The figure confirms that multiplex influence stabilizes cultural diversity against increasing 
levels of cultural mutation, and that the effect is persistent even after 10.000.000 iterations.  
 Figure 7 also reveals another difference between dyadic and multiplex influence. Av-
erage diversity increases with the level of mutation when influence is dyadic but not when it 
is multiplex. The explanation is the increase in the number “fads” precipitated by higher mu-
tation under dyadic influence, as illustrated by Figure 6. When the population moves from one 
monocultural state into another one, there is temporarily a high level of diversity in the transi-
tion phase where the diffusion of the cultural innovation creates many different cultural pro-
files that are subsequently eliminated by the homogenizing effects of social influence. As 
Figure 7 shows, multiplex influence makes a population much more resistant to the outbreak 
of fads. The consequence is that monocultures do not arise (at least not within the time hori-
zon of this experiment) under multiplex influence even at mutation rates as high as r=0.05. 
Under dyadic influence, the result is monoculture punctuated by brief outbursts of high diver-
sity when the mutation rate is this high.  
 
4. Discussion 
r
  18
Axelrod (1997) has proposed the combination of homophily and social influence as explana-
tion of the stability of cultural diversity. However, subsequent work by Klemm and others  
has shown that stable diversity collapses when only small levels of cultural mutation are 
added to the model. We have shown that this fragility of Axelrod’s result may in turn be an 
artifact of his overly conservative implementation of the assumption of homophily. We added 
interaction thresholds and multiplex social influence as two plausible modifications to the 
model. We showed how both modifications can independently restore diversity even under 
considerable levels of cultural mutation. Our analyses also point to new substantive implica-
tions of our modified cultural dissemination model. While Axelrod argued that more cultural 
features reduce diversity, we showed that with interaction thresholds, more features may in-
crease diversity in a certain region of  the parameter space.    
 Our analysis depends on a range of simplifications that point to directions for future 
research. Earlier studies of social influence (French 1956; Abelson 1964) point to an assump-
tion in Axelrod’s model that is problematic. Axelrod assumes that all cultural features are 
nominal, like religion and language (hence represented as nominal scales). With nominal fea-
tures, people are either identical or different, there are no shades of gray. However, it is im-
mediately apparent that cultures can also be distinguished by metric features with degrees of 
similarity, such as the normative age of marriage or the enthusiasm for jazz. Even religion and 
language can form nested hierarchies in which some classes are closer to others (e.g., Congre-
gationalists are closer to Unitarians than to Islamic Fundamentalists). In a previous study 
(Flache and Macy 2006b) we found that local convergence does not lead to global diversity in 
Axelrod’s model if even a single cultural dimension is metric, no matter how many dimen-
sions are nominal. Cultural homogeneity is then the ineluctable outcome, even when we as-
sume away random mutation. Future work needs to explore whether both of the solutions we 
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propose in this paper also generalize to the case of metric features, and to settings where di-
versity is threatened by a combination of metric features and cultural mutation.  
 Another simplification concerns the model of the elementary mechanisms. In particu-
lar, previous studies of cultural dissemination including the present paper have largely ne-
glected the negative side of homophily and social influence – xenophobia and differentiation. 
Some exceptions are recent studies by Mark (2003) and Macy et al (2003) and Flache and 
Macy (2006a) that allow for “negativity.” Negativity may explain how agents remain different 
even when social interaction between them remains possible, but this has yet to be shown 
within the modeling framework of Axelrod’s cultural dissemination model. We believe this is 
another promising avenue for future work. 
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